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Abstract
The Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) theory of belief update has been proposed as a reasonable
model for revising beliefs about a changing world. However, the semantics of update relies on
information which is not readily available. We describe an alternative semantical view of update
in which observationsare incorporated intoa belief set by: a) explainingthe observation in terms
of a set of plausible events that might have caused that observation; and b) predicting further
consequences of those explanations. We also allow the possibility of conditional explanations.
We show that this picture naturally induces an update operator conforming to the KM postulates
under certain assumptions. However, we argue that these assumptions are not always reasonable,
and they restrict our abilityto integrate update with other forms of revisionwhen reasoning about
action.
￿Some parts of this report appeared in preliminary form as “An Event-Based Abductive Model of Update,” Proc. of
Tenth CanadianConf. on in AI, Banff, Alta., (1994).
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1 Introduction
Reasoning about action and change has been a central focus of research in AI for many years, dating
at least to the origins of the situation calculus [20]. For example, a planning agent must be able to
predict the effects of its actions on the world in order to verify whether a potential plan achieves a
desired goal. Actions effect changes in the world, and agents must be able to modify their beliefs
about the world to reﬂect such considerations. Furthermore, an agent situated in a dynamic world
must be able to reason about changes in the world not simply due to its own actions, but due to the
occurrence of exogenous events as well.
One of the most inﬂuential theories of belief change has been the AGM theory proposed by
Alchourr´ on, G¨ ardenfors andMakinson[1]. Imagineanagent possessesa beliefset orknowledgebase
KB. The AGM theory provides a set of postulates constraining the possible ways in which the agent
can change KB in order to accommodate a new belief
A. Notice that this revision of KB need not be
straightforward, for the new belief
A may conﬂict with beliefs in KB. It was pointed out by Winslett
[27] that the AGM theory is inappropriate for reasoning about changes in belief due to the evolution
of a changing world. A new form of belief change dubbed update was proposed in full generality by
Katsuno and Mendelzon [16], who provided a set of postulates, distinct from the AGM postulates,
that characterize this type of belief change.
Semantically, Katsuno and Mendelzon have shown that belief update can be characterized by
positinga familyof orderings over possibleworlds,witheach ordering beingindexedby someworld.
Theorderingassociatedwithaspeciﬁcworldcanbeviewedintuitivelyasdescribingthemostplausible
ways in which that world can change. To update a knowledge base KB with some proposition
A, the
worlds admitted by KB are each updated by ﬁnding the most plausible change associated with that
world satisfying
A (we describe this formally below). As a concrete example, suppose that someone
observes that the grass in front of her house is wet. She is not sure whether she left her book outside
on the patio, but concludes that if the book is outside it is wet too. There are two possible worlds
admitted by her knowledge,
O and
O (the book is outside or it is not). When the ﬁrst possibility is
updated with the observation of wet grass, a wet book is the result. When the second possibility is
updated, the book remains dry. The conditional belief
O
 
W (the book is wet onlyif it was outside)
is part of our agent’s updated belief set.
In this paper, we present an abductive model of belief change suitable for updating beliefs in
response to a changing world. While our semantics induces a class of belief change operators that is
somewhat moregeneral thanKatsuno-Mendelzon(KM)updateoperators, themostcompellingaspect
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of our model is the fact that it breaks the KM semantics into smaller, more primitive parts. We argue
that such a model provides a more natural perspective on belief update in response to changes in the
world, and exploits information that is more readily available or easily obtainable from users of a
system. In the following, we use the term update to describe any process of belief change used to
capture changes in belief due to change in the world (not simplythose models conformingto the KM
postulates).
In general, we take update to be a two stage process of explanation followed by prediction:
ﬁrst, an agent explains an observation by postulating some plausible event or events that could have
caused that observationto hold, relative to its initial state of knowledge; second, an agent predicts the
(further) consequences of these events, relative to this initial state. In our example, there are several
possible causes of wet grass, among them the sprinkler turning on automatically, or rain. If rain is
the most plausible of these causing events, our agent concludes that everything on the patio is wet,
including the book if it is out there. Had sprinkler been the most plausible explanation, a different
conclusion would have been reached: the book would be dry regardless of its location. It is these
considerations that allow an agent to determine just what changes in the world are most plausible.
Intuitively, information about the effects of events, as well as their relative plausibility, will be more
readily available or easier to assess than a direct ordering of plausibility over possible “evolutions”
of the world.
We formalize this notionin an abstract manner obtaininga class of explanation-changeoperators
that are similarin spirit and intent to KM update operators, but somewhat more general. We note that
explanation has often been closely linked with belief revision [12]. Indeed, Boutilier and Becher [5]
present a model of abduction where explanations are determined by explicit belief revision. Given
this connection and the fact that update can be viewed as an essentially abductive process, we may
also take update to be a certain kind of belief revision. This stands in stark contrast with the accepted
wisdom that update and revision are orthogonal forms of belief change. While we could cast our
model as a form of belief revision, this would detract from the main point of the paper. However, we
do elaborate on this connection in the concluding section.
In Section 2 we review the KM postulates for belief update and the KM semantics. In Section 3
we analyze this semantics more closely, and break it into more basic elements. We describe our
abductive view of update and show its relationship to the KM model. In particular, we show that
certain semantic assumptions naturally give rise to the KM theory; however, we argue that these
assumptions are inappropriate as general update principles. We also brieﬂy describe and characterize
a special class of update operators. In Section 4, we analyze our model more deeply and discuss the
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connections to belief revision. We also argue that proper modiﬁcation of belief states in response to
observations in dynamicsettings involves a combinationof belief revisionand belief update. Finally,
we compare our construction to the model of update proposed by del Val and Shoham [8]. Proofs of
the main results can be found in the appendix.
2 The Semantics of Update
Katsuno and Mendelzon [16] have proposed a general characterization of belief update. Update
is distinguished from belief revision conceptually by viewing update as reﬂecting belief change in
response to changes in the world, whereas revision is thought to be more appropriate for changing
(possibly erroneous) beliefs about a static world. Update is described by Katsuno and Mendelzon
with a set of postulates constraining acceptable update operators and a possible worlds semantics,
both of which we review here.
We assume the existence of some knowledge base KB, the set of beliefs held by an agent about
the current state of the world. We take our underlying logic to be propositional, based on a ﬁnitely
generated language
LCPL. We use
W to denote the set of possibleworlds (or models) suitablefor this
language.
If some new fact
A is observed in response to some (unspeciﬁed) change in the world (i.e., some
action or event occurrence), then the formula KB
 
A denotes the new belief set incorporating this
change. The KM postulates [16] governing admissibleupdate operators are
(U1) KB
 
A
j
=
A
(U2) If KB
j
=
A then KB
 
A is equivalent to KB
(U3) If KB and
A are satisﬁable, then KB
 
A is satisﬁable
(U4) If
j
=
A
 
B then KB
 
A
  KB
 
B
(U5)
(KB
 
A
)
 
B
j
= KB
 
(
A
 
B
)
(U6) If KB
 
A
j
=
B and KB
 
B
j
=
A then KB
 
A
  KB
 
B
(U7) If KB is complete then
(KB
 
A
)
 
(KB
 
B
)
j
= KB
 
(
A
 
B
)
(U8)
(KB1
  KB2
)
 
A
 
(KB1
 
A
)
 
(KB2
 
A
)
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A better understanding of the mechanism underlying update can be achieved by considering the
possible worlds semantics described by Katsuno and Mendelzon, which they show to be equivalent
to the postulates. For any proposition
A, let
k
A
k denote the set of worlds satisfying
A. Clearly,
kKB
k represents the set of possibilities we are prepared to accept as the actual state of affairs. Since
observation
O is the result of some change in the actual world, we ought to consider, for each
possibility
w
 
kKB
k, the most plausible way (or ways) in which
w might have changed in order to
make
O true. We will call such a change in any world an “evolution” of that world. To capture this
intuition, Katsuno and Mendelzon postulate a family of preorders
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g
where each
 
w is a reﬂexive, transitive relation over
W. We interpret each such relation as follows:
if
u
 
w
v then
u is at least as plausiblea change relative to
w (or an evolutionof
w) as is
v. Finally, a
faithfulness conditionis imposed: for every world
w, the preorder
 
w has
w as a minimum element;
that is,
w
 
w
v for all
v
 
=
w. Intuitively, this ensures that
w is itself more plausible than any other
evolution of
w.1
Naturally, the most plausiblecandidate changes in
w that result in
O are those worlds
v satisfying
O that are minimal in the relation
 
w. The set of such minimal
O-worlds for each relation
 
w, and
each
w
 
kKB
k, intuitively capture the situations we ought to accept as possible when updating KB
with
O. In other words,
kKB
 
O
k
=
[
w
 
kKB
k
fmin
 
w
f
v :
v
j
=
O
g
g
where min
 
w
X is the set of minimal elements (w.r.t.
 
w) within
X. Katsuno and Mendelzon show
that suchaformulationofupdatecaptures exactlythesameclass ofchange operatorsas thepostulates;
thus, we can treat this as an appropriate semantics for the KM update theory.
As an example, consider the following scenario illustrating the application of the KM update
semantics to database update. We know certain facts about an employee Fred: his salary is $40,000,
his job classiﬁcation is level
N, and so on. But, we are unsure whether he works for the Purchasing
department or the Finance department. Thus, our KB admits two possibilities,
w and
v, reﬂecting
this uncertainty (see Figure 1). If the orderings
 
w and
 
v are as indicated in the ﬁgure, then
KB updated with the fact that Fred’s salary is $50,000 contains, among other things, the facts
Dept(P)
  Dept(F), Dept(P)
  Level(N) and Dept(F)
  Level(N+1). This is due to
1Katsuno and Mendelzonuse the term persistent to describe such orderings.
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Sal(40)
Lev(N)
Dept(P) Dept(P)
Lev(N)
Dept(P)
Sal(40)
Lev(N)
w w’ w’’
v v’ v’’
Sal(50)
Lev(N+1)
Lev(N+1)
Sal(50)
Sal(50)
KB
Sal(45)
Dept(F) Dept(F) Dept(F)
Lev(N)
Figure 1: An Update Model
the fact that the closest world to
w with the new salary is
w
 , while the closest to
v is
v
 
 ; hence, KB is
determined by the set of worlds
f
w
 
 
v
 
 
g. This may reﬂect the fact that such a raise comes only with
a promotion in Finance, whereas promotions are rare and raises more frequent in Purchasing.
The KM semantics shows very clearly one of the main distinctions between update and belief
revision. In belief revision (e.g., using the AGM theory), if an observation
O is consistent with KB,
then the revised KB
 
O must be equivalent to KB
 
f
O
g. This needn’t be the case for update. Given
KB as above, we may receive an update transaction
O
 
(Dept(P)
  Sal(40)
)
 
(Dept(F)
  Sal(50)
)
While KB
 
f
O
g entails Dept(P), and is captured semanticallyby the set
f
w
g, KB
 
O corresponds
to the set
f
w
 
v
 
 
g and does not commit Fred to a particular department. The crucial distinction is
update’s willingness to consider the evolution of each possible world individually. Belief revision
only considers the belief set KB as a whole.
3 Update as Explanation
3.1 Plausible Causes of Observations
The orderings uponwhichupdate semantics are basedare interpreted as describingthemost plausible
manner in which a world might change. Given the role of update, this interpretation seems correct:
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worlds closer to
w in the ordering
 
w are somehowmore plausiblestates intowhich
w might evolve.
It seems reasonable thento update a KB by consideringthose most plausiblechanges. In our example
above, if Fred is in Purchasing (world
w), then a change of salary of this type is more likely to come
without a change in rank (
w
 ) than with a change in rank (
w
 
 ).
While reasonable, it begs the question: why would one change be judged more plausible than
another? Intuitively, it seems that there are certain events or actions that would cause a change in
w, and that those leading to
w
  are more plausible than those leading to
w
 
 . For example, the event
RAISE might be more probable than the event PROMOTION (at least, in Purchasing).
Given an observation Sal(50000) — in this case an update transaction — an agent might
come to believe Dept(P)
  Level(N) (as we have in our example) as follows: assuming
Dept(P), the most plausible event that might cause such a change in salary is RAISE (rather than
PROMOTION). Thus RAISE is the best explanation for the observation. Adopting this explanation
has,asafurtherconsequence, thatjobrank(anddepartment)staysthesame; thus,beliefinLevel(N)
remains. In contrast,RAISE (to$50,000)is less likelythanPROMOTION intheFinancedepartment.2
Thus, PROMOTION is the most plausible explanation for the observation, which has the additional
consequence Level(N+1). Thus, the two beliefs Dept(P)
  Level(N) and Dept(F)
 
Level(N+1) hold in the updated belief state.
This leads to a very different view of update. When confronted with an observation or update
O,
an agent seeks an explanation of
O, in terms of some external event that would have caused
O had it
occurred.3 While many events might explain
O in this way, some will be more plausible than others,
and it will be those the agent adopts. Given such an explanation, one may then proceed to predict
further consequences of these events, and produce the set of beliefs arising from the observation.
With this point of view, the essence of update is captured by a two-step process: a) explanation of
the observation in terms of some event(s); and b) prediction of the (additional) consequences of that
event. We do not presume that the agent has direct knowledge of the event occurrence. If such
direct knowledgeis availablethe problembecomes muchsimpler,for the agent can simplypredict the
effects of this event using some theory of action. This is a very speciﬁc update problem, restricting
an agent to updating by observations of the form “Event
E occurred.” No explanation is required.4
2In our example, we assumethat a raise to $45,000 is most likely (world
v
0), but that a higher raise is unlikely without a
promotion.
3In this paper we will usually think of (external) events as the impetus for change, rather than actions over which the
agent has direct control (or of which the agent has direct knowledge).
4This assumptionis embodiedto a certain extent in the update modelsof del Val and Shoham[8, 9] and Goldszmidt and
Pearl [13], as we discussin Section 4.
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Before formalizing this idea, it is important to realize that this perspective is very natural. It is
reasonable to suppose that an agent (or builder of a KB) has ready access to some description of the
preconditionsandeffects ofthepossibleeventsinagivendomain. Thisassumptionunderlies allwork
in classical planning and reasoning about action, ranging from STRIPS [10] to the situation calculus
[20, 24] to more sophisticated probabilistic representations [18, 7]. With such information, the
predictions associated with explanations (event occurrences) can be easily determined. Furthermore,
an ordering over the relative likelihood of possible events also seems something which an agent or
system designer or user might easily postulate. This should certainly be easier to construct than a
direct ordering over worlds according to their likelihood of “occurring.” Indeed, we will show that
such an ordering over worlds is derivable from this more readily available information.
This provides a possibleinterpretationof the update process, and in our view, a very natural one.5
Furthermore, as we describe in the concluding section (and in detail in [2]), by breaking update into
two components, we will be able to extend the type of reasoning about action one can perform in this
setting.
Usingexplanationfor reasoningabout actionhas been proposedbyanumberofpeople,especially
within the framework of the situation calculus. Work on temporal projection and prediction failures
often exploits the notion of explanation. For instance, Morgenstern and Stein [21] propose a model
where an observation that conﬂicts with the predicted effects of an agent’s actions causes the agent to
infer theexistence of someexternal event occurrence. Shanahan [26] proposes a model witha similar
motivation, but adopts a truly abductive model (where candidate events are hypothesized rather than
deduced from an observation). Our model will be rather different in several ways. First, explanations
will be conditional (i.e., explaining events are conditioned on certain propositions). Second, the
criteria used for adoptingexplainingevents will be based on the relative plausibilityof events. Third,
we will not limit attention to any particular model of action (such as the situation calculus). Finally,
our goal is toshowhowexplanationcan account forthe updateofa knowledgebase. We shouldpoint
out that Reiter [25, and personal communication]has informallysuggestedthat update can be viewed
as explanationtoevents causingan observation. We will proceed toshowthat thisis, in fact, the case.
5This shouldnot be takenas a criticism of updatefor requiring that a reasoningagent havean explicitly speciﬁedfamily
of preorders at its disposal. Onecan reasonaboutupdatewith syntacticconstraints or by anyother means. The point is that,
from a semantic point of view, the preorders and syntactic constraints seem to be induced by considerations about action
effects and plausible event occurrences.
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3.2 A Formalization
To capture update in terms of explanation, we require two ingredients missing from the Katsuno-
Mendelzon account: a set of events that cause changes, and an event orderingthat reﬂects the relative
plausibilityof different event occurrences.
We assume a ﬁnitely generated propositional language with an associated set of worlds
W. Let
E be a ﬁnite event set, the elements of which are primitive events. In general,
e
 
E is a mapping
e :
W
  2
W. For
w
 
W and
e
 
E, we use
e
(
w
) to denote the result of event
e occurring in world
w. This is a set of worlds, each of which is a possible outcome of
e occurring at
w. An event with
more than one possible outcome is nondeterministic. A deterministic event is any
e
 
E such that
e
(
w
) is a singleton set for each
w
 
W. A deterministic event set is an event set all of whose events
are deterministic. We assume that events are total functions on the domain
W, so that every event
can be applied to each world. In addition, we insist that
e
(
w
)
 
=
  for each
e
 
w.6 We emphasize that
not only are all possible outcomes of an event captured by the set
e
(
w
), but also that each world in
e
(
w
) is a legitimate, plausible outcome.
Typically, events are not speciﬁed as mappings of this type. Rather, for each event (or action), a
list of conditions are provided that inﬂuence the outcome of the event. For each such condition, a set
of effects is speciﬁed. An example of this is the classical situation calculus representation of actions
(in the deterministic case). Another is the modiﬁed STRIPS representation presented in [18, 6]. The
key feature of these, and other representations, is that each action/event induces a function between
worlds (or worlds and sets of worlds).7 Thus, most action representations will ﬁt within this abstract
model. While we do not delve into the representation of actions, our examples will suggest ways in
which traditional representations can be augmented with the features of our model.
As a further generalization, if events are nondeterministic, we might suppose that the possible
outcomes are ranked by probability or plausibility. We set aside this complication(but see [2]).
In order to explain certain observations by appeal to plausible event occurrences, we need some
metric for ranking explanations. We assume that the events in the set
E are ranked by plausibility;
6It is best to think of events as analogous to “action attempts.” If the preconditions for the “successful” occurrence
of the event are not true at a given world, then the effects can be null, or unpredictable or something like that. Allowing
preconditions is a trivial and uninteresting addition for our purposeshere.
7In the case of the situation calculus, dynamic logic or other temporal formalisms, one would require some solution to
the frame problem. For example, the solution of Reiter [24] induces just such a mapping.
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hence, we postulate an indexed family of event orderings
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g
over
E. We take
e
 
w
f to mean that event
e is at least as plausible (or likely to occur) as event
f in
world
w.8
We require that
 
w be a preorder for each
w, and will occasionally assume that
 
w is a total
preorder. Once again, we do not expect that this family of orderings will be presented explicitly.
Compact representation schemes are possible. For example, in our database example we might
supposethatausercanspecifytheconstraintthataRAISE eventismoreplausiblethanaPROMOTION
event for employees of the Purchasing department. The relative plausibility need not be asserted
explicitly for each world satisfying Dept(P).
We note that there are few restrictions on the relative plausibilityof events in any given ordering
 
w. The only structural basis for the logical comparison of events is through outcome sets, but
these provide no logical constraints on relative plausibility. If we have two events
e and
f such that
e
(
w
)
 
f
(
w
), we impose no constraints on the relative ordering of
e and
f in
 
w. In particular, we
cannot insist that an event
e with fewer possible outcomes be judged more likely than an event
f.
For instance, imagine two events, ﬂipping a coin and placing a coin, such that ﬂipping results in two
possibleoutcomes (heads, tails) and placinghas three outcomes (heads, tails, edge). This provides no
a priori reason to consider ﬂipping or placing more likely than the other.
Putting these ingredients together, we have the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition An event model is a triple
h
W
 
E
 
 
i, where
W is a set of worlds,
E is a set of events
(mappings
e :
W
  2
W)and
  isanindexedfamilyofevents orderings
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g(where
each
 
w is a preorder over
E).
Deﬁnition A deterministic event model is an event model where every
e
 
E is deterministic (i.e.,
for all
w
 
W,
e
(
w
)
=
f
v
g for some
v
 
W). A total order event model is an event model
where each event ordering
 
w is a total preorder over
E.
Givenanevent model,anagent isabletoincorporateanewpieceofinformationthroughaprocess
of explanation and prediction as discussed above. An explanation of an observation is some event
e
8Other models of event orderings are possible, including using a ﬁxed ordering for all worlds, or associating event
plausibility with belief sets (or sets of worlds) rather than individual worlds. However, these seem less compelling.
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that, when applied to the world under investigation, possibly causes
O. However, the agent should
be interested only in the most plausible such events.
Deﬁnition Let
O be some proposition and
w
 
W. The set of weak explanations of
O relative to
w
is
E
x
p
l
(
O
 
w
)
= min
 
w
f
e
 
E :
e
(
w
)
 
k
O
k
 
=
 
g
An event
e is a weak explanation of
O relative to
w iff
e
 
E
x
p
l
(
O
 
w
). If
E
x
p
l
(
O
 
w
)
=
 ,
we say that
O is unexplainable relative to
w.
In other words,
e explains
O in a world
w just when there is some possibleoutcome of
e that satisﬁes
O, and no more plausible event
e
  has this feature. Such explanations are called weak explanations
because, before the observation
O is made, an agent would not, in general, be able to predict that
O
would result from
e. The agent merely knows that
O is true of some possible outcome. This is often
the most we can expect in a domain with nondeterministic events. For example, someone tossing a
coin ontoa chess board is a quitereasonable explanationfor the fact that the coin is ona black square;
but knowing the event occurred is not enough to predict that outcome, for it might well have landed
on a white square.
A predictive explanation is similar, but we insist that each outcome of
e satisﬁes
O.
Deﬁnition The set of predictive explanations of
O relative to
w is
E
x
p
l
P
(
O
 
w
)
= min
 
w
f
e
 
E :
e
(
w
)
 
k
O
k
g
Anevent
eisapredictiveexplanationof
Orelativeto
wiff
e
 
E
x
p
l
P
(
O
 
w
). If
E
x
p
l
P
(
O
 
w
)
=
 , we say that
O is not predictively explainable relative to
w.
The distinction between weak and predictive explanations is very similar to that made between
consistency-based diagnosis [23] and predictive (or abductive) diagnosis [22]. This distinction is
illustrated in Figure 2. Both
e and
f are nondeterministic events. Event
e predictively explains
O,
while
f weakly explains
O but does not predictively explain
O. We are interested here in weak
explanations, for these seem most appropriate when dealing with nondeterministicevents. However,
we note the following:
Proposition 1 If
e is a deterministic event, then
e weakly explains
O iff
e predictively explains
O.
Corollary 2 If
E
M is a deterministic event model,
O is weakly explainable iff
O is predictively
explainable.
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w
e
e
f
f
O
O
~O
O
Figure 2: Weak and Predictive Explanations
For a particular world
w,
E
x
p
l
(
O
 
w
)denotes those most plausible events that could cause
O to
be true. The possibilities admitted by such a set of explanations are the possible results of each of
these events. To determine these we simply evolve or progress
w in accordance with these possible
event occurrences; that is:
Deﬁnition The progression of world
w given observation
O is the set of worlds
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
)
=
[
f
e
(
w
)
 
k
O
k :
e
 
E
x
p
l
(
O
 
w
)
g
Note that if
O is unexplainable relative to
w, then
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
)
=
 . This means that there is no event
(among those speciﬁed in the model)that could have caused
w to evolve into a world that satisﬁes
O.
The occurrence of
O relative to
w is impossible. We also note that if we are restrict our attention to
predictive explanations, or to deterministicevent models, we can rewrite this deﬁnition as
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
)
=
[
f
e
(
w
) :
e
 
E
x
p
l
P
(
O
 
w
)
g
Takinga cuefrom theKatsuno-Mendelzonupdatesemantics,theprogressionofaknowledgebase
KB given a particular observation
O is obtained by consideringall plausible evolutions of each world
w
 
kKB
k. However, if
O is unexplainable for some
w
 
kKB
k, we take
O to be unexplainable
relative to KB as a whole.
Deﬁnition The progression of KB given observation
O is the set of worlds
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
)
=
[
f
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
) :
w
 
kKB
k
g
If
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
)
=
  for some
w
 
kKB
k, we let
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
)
=
 .
The motivation for this last condition, that
O must be explainable relative to every
w
 
kKB
k,
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comesfromtheKMupdatesemanticsitself. IntheKMtheoryofupdate,theupdatedKBisconstructed
by considering the possibleevolutionof every possibilityadmittedby KB. We duplicate this intuition
by considering the progression function of every world in
kKB
k. If no such evolution is possible for
one oftheseworlds,wetrivializetheresultofupdatingKB. We mighthaveallowedtheprogressionof
KB to be nontrivial even if some worlds could not evolve so as to satisfy
O, and deﬁne
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
)
without this last condition. In other words, we might have considered
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
) to be as in the
deﬁnition, but simplyaccept, when
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
)
=
 , that
w contributes nothingtothe constructionof
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
). However, weadoptthecurrentapproachfortworeasons. First,ourgoalistopursuethe
analogy with the KM update semantics. Our deﬁnition is a direct adaptation. Second, dropping this
restriction has implicationsfor the relationshipbetween belief revisionand update. Simplyexcluding
worlds whose progression is emptyis, in effect, performing revision in additionto update. While this
is generally a good idea, the correct way to bring together revision and update requires more drastic
changes in the way update is performed. We elaborate on this in Section 4.
We take progression of KB to be the semantic counterpart of the update of the theory KB. With
such a progression function, we can now deﬁne the explanation-change operator relative to a given
event model, which determines the consequences of adopting an observation.
Deﬁnition The explanation-change operator induced by an event model
E
M is
 
E
M:
KB
 
E
M
O
=
f
A
 
LCPL :
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
)
j
=
A
g
In our example, we have two event types, Promotion and Raise. A PROMOTION event (promotion
of one level) ensures an employee’s rank is increased and his salary is raised $10,000. Events
RAISE(5) andRAISE(10) raisesalary$5000and$10,000,respectively. Weassumethefollowing
event orderings for each department:
Purchasing: RAISE(10)
  PROMOTION
  RAISE(5)
Finance: RAISE(5)
  PROMOTION
  RAISE(10)
This is illustrated in Figure 3, where shorter event arcs depict more plausible occurrences. The
explanation relative to purchasing is a raise, while for ﬁnance it is a promotion. The updated KB
  is
determined by
w
  and
v
 
  and induces the beliefs described earlier.
As another example, imagine that a warehouse control agent expects a series of trucks to pickup
and deliver certain shipments, but at time
t1 an expected truck
A has not arrived. Assume that this
might be explained by snow on Route 1 or a breakdown. If snow is the most plausible of the two
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w’’
v’
KB
Prom
R(10)
R(5)
v
w w’
Prom
v’’
KB’
Figure 3: An Event Ordering
events, the agent might reach further conclusions by predicting the consequences of that event; for
example, trucks
B and
D will also be delayed since they use the same route. The proper explanation
and subsequent predictions are crucial, for theywill impact on the agent’s decisionregarding stafﬁng,
scheduling and so on. Notice also that such explanations are defeasible, which is reﬂected in the
defeasibility of update: if
A is late but
B is on time, then snow is no longer plausible (therefore, e.g.,
D will not be delayed).
Finally, we can formalize our initial example. We ﬁrst adopt a conditional STRIPS-like represen-
tation of events, using variables to schematically capture a set of propositions, and take each event
speciﬁcation to induce the obvious transformation on possible worlds (see, e.g., [18, 6]). We have
two possible events, RAIN and SPRINKLER, with effects as follows:
Event Condition Effect
RAIN On(grass,x) Wet(x), Wet(grass), Wet(patio)
On(patio,x) Wet(x), Wet(grass), Wet(patio)
else Wet(grass), Wet(patio)
SPRINKLER On(grass,x) Wet(x), Wet(grass)
else Wet(grass)
We also have the proposition O asserting that it is overcast, and inﬂuencing the plausibility of these
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two events. A plausibilityordering might be given as follows:
If O then RAIN
  SPRINKLER
If
 O then SPRINKLER
  RAIN
Our agent’s knowledge base consists of the beliefs
fO
 
 Wet(book)
 On(patio,book)
 
 Inside(book)
g
Given the fact O (overcast), the most plausible explanation for the observation Wet(grass) is
RAIN. The effect is then Wet(book) if On(patio,x) and
 Wet(book) if Inside(book).
Note that had it not been overcast, SPRINKLER wouldhave been the most plausibleexplanation and
our agent would rest assured that her book is dry.
We should remark at this point that the intent of this model is to provide an abductive semantic
model for update, not a computational model. Just as we do not expect actions or events to be
represented as abstract functions between worlds, explanations will not typically be generated on
a world by world basis. Usually, the same event will explain an observation for a large subset of
the worlds within
kKB
k. In particular, we expect that
kKB
k to be partitioned according to some
small number of propositions (or conditions) for which a certain event is deemed to be a reasonable
explanation. Indeed, these can naturally be viewed as conditional explanations, for example, “If
Fred is in Finance, a PROMOTION must have occurred; but otherwise a RAISE must have occurred.”
How such conditional explanations should be generated will be intimately tied to the action or event
representation chosen, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3 Relationship to The Katsuno-Mendelzon Theory
We are interested in the question of whether the explanation-change operator satisﬁes the KM update
postulates. This is not the case given the formulation above.
Proposition 3 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some event model. Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulates (U1), (U4), (U6) and (U7).
There are two reasons why the remainder of the postulates are not satisﬁed in general, hence two
assumptions that can be made to ensure that
 
E
M is an update operator.
The ﬁrst difference in the explanation-change operator is reﬂected in the failure of (U2), which
asserts that KB
 
A is equivalent to KB whenever KB entails
A. A simpleexample illustrates why this
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cannot be the case is general. Consider a KB satisﬁed by a single world
w where
w
j
=
A. Postulate
(U2) requires that the observation of
A induce no change in KB. However, it may be that the most
plausible event in the ordering
 
w is
e, where
e
(
w
)
=
f
v
g for some distinct world
v. But assuming
v
j
=
A, then KB
 
E
M
A is captured by
v and is thus distinct from
w. In order to conform to postulate
(U2), we must make the assumption that no change in
w is more plausible than change induced by
some event. Formally, we postulate null events and make these most plausible.
Deﬁnition The null event is an event
n, where
n
(
w
)
=
f
w
g for all
w
 
W.
Deﬁnition Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
ibe an event model.
E
M is centered iff the null event
n
 
E and,
for each
w
 
W and
e
 
E (
e
 
=
n) we have
n
 
w
e.
Thus, a centered event model is one in which the null event is the most plausible event that could
occur at any world. This seems to be the crucial assumption underlying postulate (U2).
Proposition 4 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some centered event model.
Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulates (U1), (U2), (U4), (U6) and (U7).
This assumptionofpersistence ofthe truthof KB seems tobe reasonableinmanydomains,but should
probably be called into question as a general principle. It may be the case in a domain where change
is the norm that, despite the fact that an observation is already believed, some change in KB should
be forthcoming. As an example, consider an agent monitoring a control system producing some
product. It observes a display that indicates whether the system is proceeding normally. If it believes
that a normal condition is displayed before the next observation, observing that the display (still)
indicates normal should not require that its other beliefs not change: it may, for instance, update the
number of units produced in response to this observation. In this sense, the more general nature of
the explanation-change operator may be desirable.
Postulate (U3) is also violated by our model, and for a similar reason, so too are (U5) and (U8).
For a given KB, we may have that
P
r
o
g
(
w
j
O
)
=
  for each
w
 
kKB
k. In other words, there are no
possibleeventsthatwouldcauseanobservation
Otobecometrue. Thepotentialforsuchunexplainable
observations clearly contradicts (U3), which asserts that KB
 
O must be consistent for any consistent
O. The assumptionunderlying (U3) in update semantics seems to be the following: every consistent
proposition is explainable, no matter how unlikely. In order to capture this assumption, we propose a
class of event models called complete.
Deﬁnition Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
i be an event model.
E
M is complete iff for each consistent
proposition
O and
w
 
W,
O is explainable relative to
w.
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Proposition 5 If
E
M is a complete event model then
P
r
o
g
(KB
j
O
)
 
=
  for any consistent
O and
KB.
This condition is sufﬁcient to ensure (U5) and (U8) are satisﬁed as well.
Proposition 6 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete event model.
Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulates (U1), (U3), (U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and (U8).
The completeness of an event model refers, in fact, to the completeness of its event set
E. If
this set is rich enough to ensure that, for every world and observation, some event can make that
observation hold, then the event model will be complete. Typically, domains will not be so well-
behaved. However, the simple addition of a miracle event to an event set will ensure completeness.
Intuitively, a miracle is some event which is less plausible than all others and whose consequences
are entirely unknown.
Deﬁnition Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
ibe an event model. A miracle is an event
m such that
m
(
w
)
=
W
for all
w
 
W, and
e
 
w
m for all
w
 
W and
e
 
E (
e
 
=
m).
Proposition 7 Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
ibe an event model. If
E contains a miracle event, then
E
M is
complete.
If all observations must be explainable, and no observation is permitted to force an agent into
inconsistency, then miracles are one embodiment of the required assumptions. The reasonableness
of such a requirement can be called into question, however. Having unexplainable observations is,
in general, a natural state of affairs. Rather than relying on miraculous explanations, the threat of an
inconsistency can force an agent to reconsider the observation, its theory of the world, or both. As
we will see in the concluding section, it is just this type of inconsistency that can force an agent to
revise its beliefs about the world prior to the observation. Update postulate (U3) makes it difﬁcult to
combine update with revision in this way.
If we put together Propositions 4 and 6, we obtain the main representation result for explanation-
change.
Theorem 8 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete, centered event
model. Then
 
E
M satisﬁes update postulates (U1) through (U8).
A useful perspective on the relationship between explanation change and update comes to light
when one considers that the plausibilityordering on events quite naturally induces an indexed family
of preorders of the type required in the Katsuno-Mendelzon update semantics.
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Deﬁnition Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
ibe an event model. The plausibilityordering induced by
E
M, for
each
w
 
W, is deﬁned as follows:
v
 
w
u iff for any event
e
u such that
u
 
e
u
(
w
), there is
some event
e
v (where
v
 
e
v
(
w
)) such that
e
v
 
w
e
u.
Intuitively, themore plausiblesome causingevent
e
v for world
v is (relative to
w), the more plausible
evolution
v of world
w is deemed to be (according to
 
w).
Theorem 9 Let
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g be the family plausibility orderings induced by some complete,
centered event model
E
M. Then
(a) Each relation
 
w is a faithful preorder over
W.
(b) The change operation determined by
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g is a KM update operator.
(c) The update operator determined by
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g is equivalent to the explanation-
change operator
 
E
M.
We note that if the event model is not centered then the generated preorder is not necessarily faithful.
If the model is not complete, then we have only a restricted form of faithfulness. It will be the case
that
w
 
w
v for any world
v that is a possible evolution of
w (i.e., if
v
 
e
(
w
) for some
e
 
E).
However, those worlds that cannot result from the application of some event to
w will be unrelated
to
w. In this case, we can say that
 
w is faithful relative to the connected component of
 
w that
includes
w. Intuitively, we want to ignore those worlds that are not “reachable” from
w. To do this
we can simply deﬁne an update operator using the relation
 
w restricted to such worlds:
f
v :
v
 
e
(
w
) for some
e
 
E
g
This ensures that unrelated worlds are not trivially minimal in the ordering relation
 
w.
If we have an event model where each event ordering is a total preorder, then the induced
plausibilityorderings over worlds are also total preorders.
Proposition 10 Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
i be a complete event model such that
 
w is a total preorder
for each
w
 
W. Then each plausibilityordering
 
w induced by
E
M is a total preorder.
Thecircumstancewhereasetofeventsistotallypreorderedbyplausibilitymayariseratherfrequently;
for instance, events may be ranked according to some integer scale, or assigned some qualitative
probability ranking. Therefore, the properties of such total update operators are of interest. We can
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extend the Katsuno-Mendelzon representation theorem to deal with update operators of this type.
The required postulate embodies a variant of the principle of rational monotonicity, cited widely in
connection with nonmonotonicsystems of inference and conditional logics (see, e.g., [3, 19]).
(U9) If KB is complete,
(KB
 
A
)
 
j
=
 
B and
(KB
 
A
)
j
=
C then
(KB
 
(
A
 
B
)
)
j
=
C
Theorem 11 An update operator
  satisﬁes postulates (U1) through (U9) iff there exists an appro-
priate family of faithful total preorders
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g that induces
  (in the usual way).
Corollary 12 Let
 
E
M be theexplanation-changeoperator inducedbysome totalorder event model.
Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulate(U9).
Indeed,KatsunoandMendelzon[16]alsodiscussthepossibilityoftotallyorderedplausibilityrankings
and provide a postulate (U9) related to the one above, and the proof of equivalence is similar to that
suggested by them (see also their work on total orders for belief revision [17]).
As aﬁnal remark, we notethat theconverses of Theorems 8and 9 are triviallyand uninterestingly
true. For any update operator
 , one can construct an appropriate set of events (and orderings) that
will induce that operator. This not of interest, since the point of explanation-change is to provide a
natural view of update, characterizable in terms of the events of an existing domain. The ability to
construct such events to capture a particular update operator provides little insight into update. The
appropriate perspective is to reject any update operator (in a given domain) that cannot be induced by
the existing set of events (or event model).
4 Concluding Remarks
We have provided an abductive model for incorporating into an existing belief set observations that
arise through the evolutionof the world. While our model allows more general forms of change than
KM update, we can impose restrictions on our model to recover precisely the KM theory. However,
these restrictions are inappropriate in many cases, calling into question the suitability of some of the
update postulates.
4.1 Relationship to Belief Revision
It has frequently been suggested that abduction can be modeled by appeal to belief revision [12].
Boutilier and Becher [5] present a model of abduction along these lines, whereby an explanation for
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an observation
O, with respect to some KB, is a sentence
E such that KB
 
E entails
O. In other
words, had an agent believed the explanation
E it would have believed the observation
O.
Theabductiveviewofupdatesuggeststhatupdatemayalsobeviewedas aform ofbeliefrevision.
Since explanations take the form of event occurrences, an interpretation using belief revision takes
update to be the process of an agent revisingits beliefs about whether an event occurred and just what
that event was. For instance, in our main example the observation Sal(50000) can be viewed as
causing an agent to give up its belief that no event has occurred (i.e., the world has not changed) and
accept the fact that something has happened — in particular, it accepts the belief
Dept(P)
  Occurred
(RAISE(10)
)
  Dept(F)
  Occurred
(PROMOTION
)
Of course, we have not provided an explicit logical language for the representation of actions or
events, and in particular, have not provided a method for revising beliefs about such occurrences.
However, there are a number of ways to model this type of belief revision, including using histories
or runs of a system as our basic semantic objects. A run is essentially a sequence of world states
capturing a particular evolution of a system. Using these as semantic primitives one can capture
beliefs about the actual state of the world in addition to event occurrences. While not directly suited
to our task, the revision model of Friedman and Halpern [11], in which runs are ranked in manner
suitable for belief revision, is precisely the type of system upon which a more elaborate model of
update, revision and explanation can be built.
When viewed in this way, certain problems withthe update model, as formulated by Katsuno and
Mendelzon and recast here, become apparent. The types of explanations one is willing to consider
are restricted to event occurrences. In other words, an agent is bound to revise its beliefs only about
possible event occurrences and their consequences. Thus, an agent making an observation is not
allowed to entertain the possibility that its knowledge base KB was incomplete or incorrect. It can
only change its beliefs about the post-event world state. Semantically, this restriction is apparent in
our deﬁnition of update (as well as Katsuno and Mendelzon’s). We require that every
w
 
kKB
k be
progressed according to likely explaining events.
It is just this restriction that calls into question the suitability of update as a “stand-alone” belief
change operator. Of particular concern, as emphasized earlier, is postulate (U3). This embodies the
assumptionthatallobservationsareexplainableintermsofsomeevent. Thisisnotalwaysreasonable.
For instance, in our database example we might have a transaction to update Fred’s salary to $90,000
when there is a salarycap of$80,000 inFinance. Thus, noevent couldhave caused this salary change
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if Fred is indeed in Finance. Far from being a miraculous occurrence, it suggests that Fred in actually
in Purchasing. Thus the observation not only forces KB to be updated (reﬂecting a change in the
world), but also revised (reﬂecting additional knowledge about the world).
Note that this is not an artifact of out deﬁnition of update, One might argue that we should
simplyupdatethoseworldsfor whichexplanationsexist andignoretheothers. Thisminoradjustment
seems reasonable, but it is nolonger simplyupdate. Rather it is a combinationof update andrevision.
Furthermore observationsmayoftenbeunexplainableforeveryworldin
kKB
k. Forinstance, suppose
a solutionis believed to be an acid, when a litmusstrip is dippedinto it and promptlyturns blue. This
is not explainable for any KB-world (it should turn red) in terms of event effects. As such, the minor
adjustment of our deﬁnition of update is not sufﬁcient. We may want to update KB consistently in
circumstances where no possible event could give rise to the observation given our current state of
belief. Instead, the intuitiveexplanation in this example consists of two parts: the ﬁrst postulates that
the event of dippingthe paper in the solutionoccurred; the second suggests that the solutionis in fact
a base. This requires revision of KB — we must change our beliefs about the pre-event state of the
world in order to modify KB correctly.
Finally notice that an observation need not be strictly unexplainable to force revision. Often
an implausible explanation will sufﬁce. For instance, a raise to $90,000 might not be impossible in
Finance, butjustsoimplausiblethatthedatabaseiswillingtoaccept thefact thatFredisinPurchasing.
Toadequatelyreﬂect suchconsiderations,wemusthavetheabilitytocomparetheplausibilityofevent
occurrences with the plausibility of beliefs about the world state. This provides further support for
more expressive models and languages in which event occurrences can be reasoned with explicitly.
Issues of this sort make postulate (U3) (and certain aspects of (U5) and (U8)) somewhat ques-
tionable, and provides motivation for adopting an abductive view of update. This perspective is
especially fruitful when combining the process of update (changing knowledge) with belief revision
(gaining knowledge). A model that puts both components together in a broader abductive framework
is described in [2]. Roughly, the logicfor belief revisionset forth in [4] is used tocapture the revision
process, but is combined with elements of dynamic logic [14] to capture the evolution of the world
due to action occurrences.
4.2 Related Work
Other have presented models of update that, like ours and unlike the KM-model, have their basis
in reasoning about action. del Val and Shoham [8, 9], using the situation calculus, show how one
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can determine an update operator by reasoning about the changes induced by a given action. Very
roughly, when some KB is to be updated by an observation
O, they postulate the existence of some
action
A
K
B
O whose predicted effects, when applied to the “situation” embodied by KB, determine the
form of the update operator. Most critically, the effect axiom for such an action states that
O holds
when
A
K
B
O is applied to KB, and other effects are inferred via persistence mechanisms.
This model differs from ours in a number of rather important ways. First, del Val and Shoham
assume that the update formula
O describes the occurrence of some action or event. This severely
restricts the scope of update, which in general can accept arbitrary propositions. They provide no
mechanism for explaining an observation using the speciﬁcation of existing actions. In order to deal
with arbitrary observations an action is “invented” for the purpose of causing any observation in any
situation. Naturally, the effects of such new actions are not speciﬁed a priori in the domain theory.
So they propose that the effect of invented actions is to induce minimal change in the knowledge
base according to some persistence mechanism. However, the plausible cause of an observation
O
may carry with it, in general, other drastic (rather than minimal) changes in KB. This can only be
accounted for by explaining an observation in terms of existing actions. A persistence mechanism is
required primarily because existing action or event speciﬁcations are not employed.
Another drawback of this model is its failure to account for the possibility that any of a number
of actions might have caused
O, and that update should reﬂect the most plausible of these causes.
Finally, there is an assumption that the update of KB is due to the occurrence of a (known) single
action. As we have described above, this will usually not be the case. Conditional explanations,
explanations that use different actions for different “segments” of KB, will be very common.
A related mechanism is proposed by Goldszmidt and Pearl [13], who use qualitative causal net-
works to represent an action theory. Again, update formula are implicitlyassumed to be propositions
asserting the occurrence of some action or event. An observation
O is incorporated by assuming
someproposition
d
o
(
O
)has becometrue, andusinga forced-action semanticstopropagateits effects.
Explanations are not given in terms of existing actions.
We should point out that both proposals adopt a theory of action that provides a representation
mechanism foractions andeffects, as wellas incorporatingasolutiontotheframe problem(implicitly
in the case of Goldszmidt and Pearl). We have side-stepped such issues by focusing on the semantics
of update. We are currently investigating various action representations, such as STRIPS and the
situationcalculus,andthemeanstheyprovideforgeneratingconditionalexplanations. Thisispartially
developed in [2], where we provide a representation for actions using a conditional default logic to
capture the defeasibility and nondeterminism of action effects, and use elements of dynamic logic to
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capture the evolution of the world. Action theories such as those exploited in [8, 13] might also be
used to greater advantage.
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A Proofs of Main Results
Proposition 3 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some event model. Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulates (U1), (U4), (U6) and (U7).
25To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
Proof Assume an event model
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
iand associated update operator
  (for simplicity we
drop the subscript). We show in turn that each of these postulates is satisﬁed.
(U1) By deﬁnition
R
e
s
(
A
 
w
)
 
k
A
k for all
w (hence for all
w
 
kKB
k). Immediately we
have KB
 
A
j
=
A.
(U4) Suppose
j
=
A
 
B. Then
e explains
A w.r.t KB iff
e explains
B, for any event
e. Thus,
KB
 
A
  KB
 
B.
(U6) Suppose KB
 
A
j
=
B and KB
 
B
j
=
A. Then we have
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
 
k
B
k and
R
e
s
(
B
 KB
)
 
k
A
k. If
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
), then for some
w
 
kKB
k we have a most plausible
explaining event
e for
A such that
v
 
e
(
w
). However, since
v
 
k
B
k,
e must also be a most
plausible explainingevent for
B as well; otherwise there must exist some more plausibleevent
f
 
ethatexplains
B, contradictingthefact that
eismostplausiblefor
A(since
R
e
s
(
B
 KB
)
 
k
A
k). Therefore,
v
 
R
e
s
(
B
 KB
), so
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
 
R
e
s
(
B
 KB
). By symmetry the reverse
containment holds, so
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
=
R
e
s
(
B
 KB
) and we have KB
 
A
  KB
 
B.
(U7) Let KB be complete so that
kKB
k
=
f
w
g for some world
w. Suppose
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
w
)
 
R
e
s
(
B
 
w
). (If there is no such
v then
(KB
 
A
)
 
(KB
 
B
) is inconsistent and (U7) holds
trivially.) Then there is some
e such that
v
 
e
(
w
) and
e is a most plausible explaining event
for both
A and
B. This ensures that
e explains
A
 
B and that
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
B
 
w
). Hence,
R
e
s
(
A
 
w
)
 
R
e
s
(
B
 
w
)
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
B
 
w
). Therefore,
(KB
 
A
)
 
(KB
 
B
)
j
= KB
 
(
A
 
B
).
￿
Proposition 4 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some centered event model.
Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulates (U1), (U2), (U4), (U6) and (U7).
Proof Given Proposition 3, we need only show that (U2) is satisﬁed by centered event models.
Assume that
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
i is such a model, inducing update operator
  (for simplicity we
drop the subscript). SupposeKB
j
=
A. Then for each
w
 
kKB
k, we have
w
j
=
A; and the null
event is the most plausible explaining event for each such world. Thus
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
=
kKB
k
and KB
 
A is equivalent to KB.
￿
Proposition 6 Let
 
E
M be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete event model.
Then
 
E
M satisﬁes postulates (U1), (U3), (U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and (U8).
Proof Given Proposition 3, we need only show that (U3), (U5) and (U8) are satisﬁed by complete
models. Assume that
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
i is such a model, inducing update operator
  (for
simplicitywe drop the subscript).
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(U3) Since
M is complete, any satisﬁable
A is explainable for every
w. So if KB is satisﬁable,
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
 
=
  and KB
 
A is satisﬁable.
(U5) Let
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
 
k
B
k (if there is no such
v, then (U5) holds trivially). Then for
some
w
 
kKB
k there is a most plausible explanation
e for
A (w.r.t.
w) such that
v
 
e
(
w
).
This event
e mustalsobe amost plausibleexplanationfor
A
 
B w.r.t.
w (otherwisesomemore
plausible event would explain
A
 
B, hence
A). Thus
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
B
 KB
). Notice that since
A
 
B must be explainable for every world, we cannot have that
R
e
s
(
A
 
B
 KB
) is set to the
empty set. Thus,
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
 
k
B
k
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
B
 KB
) and
(KB
 
A
)
 
B
j
= KB
 
(
A
 
B
).
(U8) Assume that KB1
 KB2 is satisﬁable. We have
w
 
R
e
s
(
A
 KB1
 KB2
) iff there is some
v
 
kKB1
 KB2
k suchthat
w
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
v
). Such a
v is either in
kKB1
kor
kKB2
k, sothis holds
iff
w
 
R
e
s
(
A
 KB1
)
 
R
e
s
(
A
 KB2
). Therefore,
(KB1
  KB2
)
 
A
 
(KB1
 
A
)
 
(KB2
 
A
).
￿
Theorem 9 Let
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g be the family plausibility orderings induced by some complete,
centered event model
E
M. Then
(a) Each relation
 
w is a faithful preorder over
W.
(b) The change operation determined by
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g is an update operator.
(c) The update operator determined by
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g is equivalent to the explanation-
change operator
 
E
M.
Proof Let
w be some world in a complete, centered event model
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
i, and let
 
w be
an induced ordering.
(a) That
 
w is reﬂexive and transitive follows immediately from the deﬁnition
 
w in
terms of the event ordering
 
w and the fact that
 
w is itself reﬂexive and transitive.
Hence
 
w is apreorder. Since nullaction
n
 
w
eforall
e
 
=
n and
n
(
w
)
=
f
w
g,we
have
w
 
w
v for all
v
 
=
w (if
v
 
e
v
(
w
) for some event
e
v). Thus
 
w is faithful.
Finally, since
E
M is complete, for any
v there is some
e
v suchthat
v
 
e
v
(
w
). Thus
 
w is persistent.
(b) The representation theorem of Kastuno and Mendelzon ensures that the family of
orderings
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g generates anupdateoperator satisfying(U1) through(U8).
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(c) Denote by
  the update operator generated by
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g. We will show that
KB
 
A
  KB
 
E
M
A for any consistent KB and
A. Assume
v
 
k
A
k. We have
v
 
kKB
 
A
k iff
v
 
 
w
 
kKB
k
fmin
 
w
f
v :
v
j
=
A
g
g
iff for some
w
 
kKB
k, if
u
 
w
v, then
u
 
j
=
A
iff for some
w
 
kKB
k and event
e,
v
 
e
(
w
) and
for all
e
 
 
w
e, we have
e
 
(
w
)
 
k
A
k
=
 
iff for some
w
 
kKB
k,
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 
w
)
iff
v
 
R
e
s
(
A
 KB
)
iff
v
 
kKB
 
A
k
￿
Proposition 10 Let
E
M
=
h
W
 
E
 
 
i be a complete event model such that
 
w is a total preorder
for each
w
 
W. Then each plausibilityordering
 
w induced by
E
M is a total preorder.
Proof Theorem 9 ensures that
 
w is a preorder. For any world
u, let
e
u denote any event that has
outcome
u relative to
w; i.e.,
u
 
e
u
(
w
) (such an event must exist since
E
M is complete).
Consider two worlds
u and
v. Suppose
v
 
 
w
u. Then there must be some
e
u such that for all
e
v,
e
v
 
 
w
e
u. Since
 
w is a total preorder,
e
u
 
 
w
e
v for all such
e
v; and
u
 
w
v. Thus,
 
w is
a total preorder.
￿
Theorem 11 An update operator
  satisﬁes postulates (U1) through (U9) iff there exists an appro-
priate family of faithful total preorders
f
 
w:
w
 
W
g that induces
  (in the usual way).
Proof We ﬁrst assume a suitable family of preorders. The representation result of Katsuno and
Mendelzon ensures that the induced update operator
  satisﬁes (U1) through (U8). We now
show that it also satisﬁes (U9). LetKB be complete with
kKB
k
=
f
w
g. Suppose KB
 
A
 
j
=
 
B
andKB
 
A
j
=
C. Let min
(
A
)denotethesetmin
 
w
f
v :
v
j
=
A
g. Thenwehavemin
(
A
)
 
k
C
k
and min
(
A
)
 
k
B
k
 
=
 . Since
 
w is a total preorder,
min
(
A
 
B
)
  min
(
A
)
 
k
B
k
 
k
C
k
so KB
 
(
A
 
B
)
j
=
C. Therefore (U9) is satisﬁed.
Now we suppose
  satisﬁes postulates (U1) through (U9). To prove that a suitable family of
orderings exist, we adopt the basic technique of Katsuno and Mendelzon [15]. However, the
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orderings are constructed in a rather different fashion to ensure that the preorders are total. As
preliminary notation, for any set of worlds
X, we write
￿
X to denote some sentence such that
k
￿
X
k
=
X. To emphasize that this will be the object of revision, we write KB
f
w
g instead of
￿
f
w
g. We note that (U1) and (U3) ensure that KB
f
w
g
 
￿
X
 
￿
X
0 for some
X
 
 
X. We will
also make use of the fact that
￿
X
0
j
=
￿
X for any
X
 
 
X. We can now deﬁne a family of
ordering relations based on
  as follows:
v
 
w
u iff
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
k
We ﬁrst show that
 
w is a faithful persistent preorder. Clearly,
 
w is reﬂexive, since (U1) and
(U3) ensure that
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
g
k. Similarly, at least one of
v or
u is in
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
k,
so either
v
 
w
u or
u
 
w
v. It is easy to verify that
 
w is faithful and persistent due to (U2)
and (U3). It simply remains to verify that
 
w is transitive. So suppose
v
 
w
u and
u
 
w
t.
This ensures that
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
k and
u
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
u
 
t
g
k.
(a) Suppose KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
 
￿
f
t
g.
Then KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
 
j
=
 
￿
f
u
 
t
g and KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
j
=
￿
f
t
g.
By (U9), KB
f
w
g
 
(
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
 
￿
f
u
 
t
g
)
j
=
￿
f
t
g,
or equivalently KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
u
 
t
g
j
=
￿
f
t
g.
But this contradicts the fact that
u
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
u
 
t
g
k.
(b) Suppose KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
 
j
=
 
￿
f
u
g and KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
j
=
 
￿
f
v
g.
Then KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
 
j
=
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g and KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
j
=
￿
f
u
 
t
g.
By (U9), KB
f
w
g
 
(
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
)
j
=
￿
f
u
 
t
g,
or equivalently KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
j
=
￿
f
u
 
t
g.
But this contradicts the fact that
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
k and
v
 
 
k
￿
f
u
 
t
g
k.
Thus, if
u
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
k then
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
k.
By (a) and (b), we know that KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g is not equivalent to
￿
f
t
g,
￿
f
u
g or
￿
f
u
 
t
g.
Thus,
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
k.
Now by (U5) we have
(KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
)
 
￿
f
v
 
t
g
j
= KB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
t
g.
Since
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
u
 
t
g
k, this conjunction is consistent, thus
v
 
kKB
f
w
g
 
￿
f
v
 
t
g
k.
Therefore
v
 
w
t and
 
w is transitive.
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Finally, we demonstrate that
kKB
 
A
k
=
[
w
 
kKB
k
fmin
 
w
f
v :
v
j
=
A
g
g
Theremainderoftheprooffollowscloselythat ofKatsunoandMendelzon,butweincludeit for
completeness. We assume KB and
A are consistent, for the relations holds trivially otherwise.
We ﬁrst show that this relation holds for any complete KB. Assume
kKB
k
=
f
w
g. We use
min
(
A
) to denote the set of minimal
A-worlds in
 
w.
Suppose
v
j
= KB
 
A but
v
 
  min
(
A
). Then there is some
u
 
w
v such that
u
j
=
A. By (U5),
(KB
 
A
)
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
j
= KB
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g; and by deﬁnition of
 
w, KB
 
￿
f
v
 
u
g
 
￿
f
u
g. But then
v
 
j
= KB
 
A. So
v must be in min
(
A
). Thus,
kKB
 
A
k
  min
(
A
).
Now suppose
v
  min
(
A
). Let
k
A
k
=
f
u1
 
 
 
 
 
u
n
g. We have that
A
 
￿
f
v
 
u1
g
 
 
 
 
 
￿
f
v
 
u
n
g
And since
v
 
u
i for each
i
 
n (since
v
  min
(
A
)), we have
v
 
kKB
 
￿
f
v
 
u
i
g
k for each
i
 
n. That is,
v satisﬁes
(KB
 
￿
f
v
 
u1
g
)
 
 
 
 
 
(KB
 
￿
f
v
 
u
n
g
)
By (U7),
v therefore satisﬁes
KB
 
(
￿
f
v
 
u1
g
 
 
 
 
 
￿
f
v
 
u
n
g
)
That is,
v
 
kKB
 
A
k. Therefore, min
(
A
)
 
kKB
 
A
k.
The result holds for any complete KB. However, any KB is equivalent to the disjunction of
some ﬁnite set of complete KBs. Thus, by (U8) we have
kKB
 
A
k
=
[
w
 
kKB
k
fmin
 
w
f
v :
v
j
=
A
g
g
￿
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